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Abstract—Windows malware detectors based on machine
learning are vulnerable to adversarial examples, even if the
attacker is only given black-box access to the model. The main
drawback of these attacks is that they require executing the
adversarial malware sample in a sandbox at each iteration of
its optimization process, to ensure that its intrusive functionality
is preserved. In this paper, we present a novel black-box attack
that leverages a set of semantics-preserving, constrained mal-
ware manipulations to overcome this computationally-demanding
validation step. Our attack is formalized as a constrained
minimization problem which also enables optimizing the trade-
off between the probability of evading detection and the size of
the injected adversarial payload. We investigate this trade-off
empirically, on two popular static Windows malware detectors,
and show that our black-box attack is able to bypass them with
only few iterations and changes. We also evaluate whether our
attack transfers to other commercial antivirus solutions, and
surprisingly find that it can increase the probability of evading
some of them. We conclude by discussing the limitations of our
approach, and its possible future extensions to target malware
classifiers based on dynamic analysis.
Index Terms—adversarial examples, malware detection, eva-
sion attacks, black-box optimization, machine learning
I. INTRODUCTION
MACHINE LEARNING techniques are becoming ubiquitousin the field of computer security. Both academia and
industry are investing time, money and human resources to
apply these statistical techniques to solve the daunting task
of malware detection. In particular, Windows malware is still
a threat in the wild, as thousands of malicious programs are
uploaded to Virus Total every day.1 Modern approaches use
machine learning to detect such threats at scale, leveraging
many different learning algorithms and feature sets [1]–[7].
While these techniques have shown promising malware-
detection capabilities, they have not been originally designed
to deal with non-stationary, adversarial problems in which
attackers can manipulate the input data to evade detection.
This has been widely demonstrated in the last decade by work
in the area of adversarial machine learning [8], [9]. This
research field studies the security aspects of machine-learning
algorithms under attacks staged either at training or at test
time. In particular, in the context of learning-based Windows
malware detectors, it has been shown that it is possible to
1https://www.virustotal.com/it/statistics/
carefully optimize adversarial malware samples against the
target system to bypass it [10]–[17].
Many of these attacks have been demonstrated in the black-
box setting in which the attacker has only query access to the
target model [14]–[17]. This really questions the security of
such systems when deployed as cloud services, as they can be
queried by external attackers who can in turn optimize their
manipulations based on the feedback provided by the target
system, until evasion is achieved.
These black-box attacks are however still not very efficient
in terms of number of queries, complexity of their optimiza-
tion process, and number of manipulations performed on the
input sample. In particular, the optimization process is overly
complex as such attacks require executing the adversarial
malware sample in a sandbox during each iteration to ensure
that its intrusive functionality is preserved. This verification
step is required for attacks that may either manipulate data
in feature space (rather than considering realizable input
modifications [18]), or consider input transformations that may
also break the functionality of the malware sample [14], [19].
To preserve the malicious behavior of the malware sample, the
attacker must indeed edit the content of the executable without
altering its original semantics, i.e. by preserving all the rules
imposed by the structure of the file format (e.g. adding sec-
tions, padding bytes, and perturbing particular header fields).
From the perspective of adversarial machine learning, an-
other limitation is that these attacks achieve evasion by
significantly manipulating the content of the input malware.
Conversely, adversarial attacks should not only be successful,
but also require minimal changes. In fact, they often optimize
a trade-off between the probability of misclassification and the
amount of changes performed on the input sample, which is
crucial to understand and quantify the robustness properties of
the learning algorithm under attack [9].
In this paper, we consider two popular learning-based win-
dows malware detectors, built on features extracted from static
code analysis (as described in Sect. II). We aim to overcome
the aforementioned limitations by proposing a novel black-
box attack (Sect. III) that enables crafting adversarial malware
samples that are both realizable and efficient to optimize. Our
attack leverages a set of semantics-preserving, constrained
malware manipulations to overcome the computationally-
demanding validation step required by recent attacks. It is
formalized as a constrained minimization problem which
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optimizes the trade-off between the probability of evading
detection and the size of the injected adversarial payload, via a
specific regularization term, while also bounding the maximum
number of queries to the target system.
Our empirical evaluation (Sect. IV) investigates this trade-
off empirically, and shows that our black-box attack is not
only able to efficiently bypass the considered learning-based
malware detectors, but that this is achieved after only few
iterations and changes. We also evaluate whether our attack
transfers to other commercial antivirus solutions, and surpris-
ingly find that it increases the probability of evading some
of them. We discuss how related work differs from ours in
Sect. V, and acknowledge the limitations of our work in
Sect. VI. We conclude by discussing possible future extensions
of this work (Sect. VII), including how to extend it to target
malware classifiers based on dynamic analysis.
II. PROGRAMS AND MALWARE DETECTION
Programs are represented on disk on a particular format,
called Windows Portable Executable (PE).2 All Windows
executable programs comply with this format, which explains
to the operating system (OS) how to load the executable in
memory before execution. The Windows PE format consists
of several components, shown in Figure 1:
• the DOS Header, which contains metadata for loading
the executable inside a DOS environment, and the DOS
stub, that contains few instructions that will print “This
program cannot be run in DOS mode” if executed inside
a DOS environment. These two components have been
kept to maintain compatibility with older Microsoft’s
operating system. From the perspective of a modern
application, the only relevant portions present inside the
DOS Header are: (i) the magic number MZ, a two-byte
long signature for the file, and (ii) the four-byte long
integer at offset 0x3c, that works as a pointer to the real
header. If one of these two values is scrambled for some
reason, the program is considered corrupted, and it will
not be executed by the OS;
• the PE Header, which contains the magic number PE and
the characteristics of the executable, such as the target
architecture that can run the program, the size of the
header and the attributes of the file;
• the Optional Header contains the information needed
by the OS for initializing the loading program. It also
contains offsets that point to useful structures, like the
Import Address Table (IAT), needed by the OS for
resolving dependencies, the Export Table offset, which
indicates where to find functions that can be referenced
by other programs, and more;
• the Section table, that is a list of entries that indicates the
characteristics of each core component of the program,
like the code section (.text), initialized data (.data), relo-
cations (.reloc) and more.
2https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows/win32/debug/pe-format
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Portable Executable under Attribution 4.0
International (CC BY 4.0)https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/)
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Fig. 1: The Windows PE file format.3Each colored section
describes a particular characteristic of the program.
The structure of an executable program can be useful
for statically inferring information about its behavior. In-
deed, most antivirus vendors apply static analysis to detect
threats in the wild, without executing suspicious programs
inside a controlled environment. This approach saves time
and resources, since the antivirus programs do not execute
the suspicious software inside the host OS. Static analysis
serves as a first line of defense, and its performance is
crucial for opposing the countless threats in the wild. We
decided to take into account two particular machine learning
detectors proposed in the state of the art that have been coded,
trained and released on GitHub with courtesy of EndGame c©.4
MalConv: is an end-to-end convolutional neural network
(CNN) proposed by Raff et al. [7]. It takes as input the
4https://www.endgame.com/
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first 2 MB of an executable and returns the probability of
being a malware. If the input executable length exceeds
this threshold, the file is truncated to fit the specified size,
otherwise, the file is padded with the value 0. Since the
padding value should be unique, all values are shifted by one
to maintain this distinction. Each byte is embedded inside a
mathematical space with eight dimensions. Since the input
size is fixed a priori, each sample is padded with a special
value to fit the decided size, or it is truncated if it exceed
that amount. The embedding is learnt by the network, as it
is needed to impose a metric over bytes. The convolutional
layers are used to correlate spatially distant bytes inside
the input binary, i.e. jumps, function calls, which metadata
describes which section, and more. The threshold for deciding
whether the input executable is malware or not is set to 0.5.
EMBER: is an open source dataset of benign and malware
along with a classifier trained on top of this data source,
proposed by Anderson et al. [6]. The model is implemented
with Gradient Boosting Decision Trees (GBDT) [20]. Differ-
ently from MalConv, the authors extract many static features
from the input binary, computing a 2,381 feature vector. In
particular, they consider:
• general file information, such as the virtual size of the file,
number of imported and exported functions, the presence
of particular sections, like debug sections, signature and
many others;
• header information, that takes into account the character-
istics of the executable, the target architecture, the version
and more;
• the byte histogram, that counts the occurrences of the
bytes, normalized w.r.t. the length of the sample;
• the byte-entropy histogram, which accounts the entropy of
the byte distribution inside the file, by applying a sliding
window over the binary. The result is a bi-dimensional
histogram, inspired to the work proposed by Saxe et
al. [1], flattened in a vector and normalized after the
process;
• information taken from strings that are at least five
printable characters long. Each string has attached some
other information, such as the number of occurrences,
how many special markers are contained, such as C:\,
HKEY or http and https;
• section information, that are properties extracted from
the sections that compose the binary. In particular, they
extract the name, the length, the entropy and the virtual
size;
• the imported / exported functions, that are the functions
required for running the program and the ones that are
offered to the other executables at run-time. Each function
is described as library:function_name.
Many of these feature sets are compressed inside an histogram
by applying the hashing trick [21], to reduce the dimension
of the problem to a smaller and manageable space. From
now on, we refer to the GBDT model trained on EMBER
dataset as EMBER. While the weaknesses of MalConv are
known [10]–[12], even EMBER is vulnerable to byte append-
ing, as demonstrated by a challenge held by EndGame. c©5
The method described by the author of the write-up has two
issues:
• the content added to the samples is taken from a single
file, and repeated multiple times inside the binary;
• if the evasion is not achieved, the algorithm tries to
append 1 KB of content that most decreases the score,
thereby enlarging the payload even further and querying
the detector hundreds of times.
Of course, the author of the write-up considered a white-
box attack with direct access to the classifier, without taking
into account any constraints, but he applied feasible trans-
formations to the input malware. From a security analyst
perspective, this is comparable to a vulnerability of the system,
and counter-measures are necessary to patch these weaknesses.
From an adversarial machine learning perspective, we want to
understand how much effort the attacker needs to apply for
evading such detectors. This write-up serves as a background
for our analysis against EMBER, as we want to highlight
that this model can be over-thrown with smaller, carefully-
crafted perturbations. This noise should be applied following
a strategy that can be repeated on every sample the attacker
owns. Moreover, this strategy should be general enough to
tackle the constraints that the attacker must satisfy, exploiting
feasible manipulations to reduce the overhead induced by the
verification step.
III. BLACK-BOX OPTIMIZATION OF ADVERSARIAL
WINDOWS MALWARE
In the malware detection domain, where industries do not
fully release the techniques they have developed, having white-
box access to the target classifier is a strong assumption.
However, this is required if one aims to craft efficient gradient-
based attacks against it [9]. To overcome this issue, the
adversary may learn a surrogate model by querying the target,
and attack the surrogate model with a (white-box) gradient-
based attack. In many cases, the attacks optimized against the
surrogate model have been shown to successfully transfer to
the target model [22]–[24].
Even if adversarial examples may be efficiently optimized
via gradient-based methods, training a surrogate model may
turn out to be a daunting task, as the attacker needs:
• to choose a differentiable model, as the algorithms for
computing adversarial examples require the computation
of the gradient. Depending on the choice, training can
be expensive in terms of time and number of machines
to use. For instance, deep neural networks need tons
of data to gain good generalization properties. The use
of GPU devices is recommended for speeding up the
computations. On top of that, the choice of the archi-
tecture matters, as it requires further analysis regarding
which details plug inside the network, how many layers,
how many neurons per layer, which activation function,
and so on. If the attacker relies on standard statistical
algorithms, e.g. SVM, it would need machines equipped
5https://towardsdatascience.com/evading-machine-learning-malware-classifiers-ce52dabdb713
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with high amount of RAM, as the algorithm must deal
with giant matrices. Even if the attacker possesses enough
computing power, it is still a time-consuming and prone-
to-error process;
• to address the presence of a feature extractor, as the
victim target model may extract information from the
input samples. This process is usually non-invertible, as
it shrinks, compresses and aggregates information inside
a mathematical space: given a feature vector, it is very
difficult or impossible to re-create the original sample.
Even if the model itself is differentiable and the attacker
can understand which feature should be modified to
change the confidence, it has control only on the real
sample. Applying transformation on it might change the
desired vulnerable feature, alongside many other, leading
the attack to fail. There is no direct mapping between the
source and the feature vector, and the attacker can’t edit
that representation as it likes.
Since these issues may be difficult to solve, the attacker
may want to opt for a black-box strategy. In this context,
no gradient method can be applied, but the adversary can
ignore the implementation details of the target victim, relying
only on the feasible manipulations he can apply on the binary
representation of the input malware. To this extent, he needs
to formalize how these transformation can be applied, and
he needs an intelligent strategy for deciding which one must
be applied for landing successful evasion attacks. However,
since this is a black-box strategy, the attacker needs to query
the victim system multiple times, either to understand how
it responds to the manipulations and to decide how to create
adversarial examples. The target is likely to be deployed on a
remote server, and each query produce network traffic. Each
time the attacker applies a transformation on a sample, a
request is sent to the target, containing the new version of the
malware. In this context, the attacker wants to be effective,
by performing the lowest amount of queries, and sending the
smallest programs as possible. The attacking strategy should
be able to tackle all these constraints, by weighting them
and proposing a sub-optimal solution that is suitable for the
attacker’s desire.
To this end, in this work we develop a novel black-
box attack, named GAMMA (Genetic Adversarial Machine
learning Malware Attack), which encapsulates both the evasion
strategy and the constraints posed by the attacker. Figure 2
shows the outline of GAMMA, whose components will be
discussed separately in the following sections. The chapter is
structured as follows: (i) Section III-A will introduce to the
reader the mathematical formalization of the attack itself and
how to balance between the constraints, (ii) Section III-B will
introduce the feasible manipulations and why they preserve the
semantics of an input program, while (iii) Section III-C will
introduce the strategy that the attacker wants to carry on for
crafting adversarial malware examples, in a black-box fashion.
A. Formalizing the attack
To quantify the skills of the attacker, we introduce the notion
of the attack feature space. Intuitively, a point in this set cor-
responds to a sequence of actions that can be performed by the
adversary without breaking the semantics of the input sample.
In this scenario, the order of application of such actions is
assumed to be in-influential to the result of the attack. Each
action is feasible: the application will change the representa-
tion and the correspondent feature vector of the sample, but
it will not alter its behavior at run-time. Since the semantics
is the same, the attacker would not need to test the sample
inside a controlled environment, saving time and resources.
Formalization: let be P the set of all possible binary
programs. We can describe a program as a string of bytes,
hence
P ⊂ {0, . . . , 255}∗
that is the language containing all strings with arbitrary length
obtained by concatenating elements in that set. Let
Sk ⊂ {0, 1}k (1)
be the set containing the capabilities of the adversary, whose
dimension is parametric over k, which specifies the number of
actions that the attacker can combine. Each element s ∈ Sk
is a (sparse) vector whose entries are either 0 or 1. In this
formalization, si = 1 means that the i-th transformation is
applied to the sample, while no action is performed otherwise.
The attacker also need a method for applying these actions
to the sample, because the goal is to produce functioning
malware from of the original one. Let
⊕ : P × Sk → P (2)
be a function that constructs a new program, injecting the
manipulations described by the attack feature vector inside
the input program. Let
f : P → [0, 1] (3)
be a function that attributes a malicious score to an input
program. This is the classifier we consider during the attack.
We assume nothing regarding the internals of this function,
except for the output value, which is a continuous proba-
bility score. The goal of the attacker is finding a particular
combinations of manipulations that lower the confidence at-
tributed by the target detector under the detection threshold.
Attack as an optimization problem: The attacker must
take into account both the amount of queries Q(s) sent to
the detector and the amount of manipulations applied to the
malware sample C(s). Since we deal with binary programs,
C(s) measures the amount of bytes that are added to the input
malware. Optimizing this quantity implies finding a set of
actions that is both stealthy and fast to compute, since the
number of queries is kept reasonably low. We denote T the
maximum number of queries sent to the detector.
While the number of requests can be tackled by fixing a
limit on the number of queries, we can treat the size constraint
as a penalty term, proportional to the number of added bytes,
to the quantity to minimize. This term acts as a regularization
term, encompassing both the reduction of the score attributed
by the classifier and the number of bytes that are used to
compute the adversarial example.
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Fig. 2: Outline of GAMMA: given a fixed set of benign sections, the algorithm generates payloads by extracting contiguous
chunks of bytes from them. For each payload, GAMMA generates adversarial malware that is passed to the input detector,
whose output is a probability of being malicious. The objective function is the sum of the score mentioned before and a penalty
term, controlled by an input regularization parameter. After having sent T queries, GAMMA outputs the best adversarial
malware found so far.
The problem can be written as:
s∗ = arg min
s∈Sk
f(x⊕ s) + λC(s) (4)
subject to Q(s) ≤ T (5)
where λ is a parameter that controls the importance of the size
constraint over the problem of finding evasive samples, and ⊕
is the injection function.By tuning this parameter we ask for
solutions with varying size of the payload. The problem is a
discrete constraint minimization problem, since the definition
of the attack feature space Sk. This implies the use of black-
box optimization algorithms that are able to take into account
discrete quantities. We show that the problem can be relaxed
to a continuous optimization problem. In particular, we apply
feasible transformations that can be decomposed, breaking the
limitation posed by the discreteness of the attack feature space.
B. Realizable attacks
Working with the file representation is daunting, since one
single byte out of place can break the whole program. In the
context of Windows PE binaries, there are only transforma-
tions that can be applied without altering the semantics of a
program. In particular, the most meaningful one are:
• appending an overlay, which means adding bytes at the
end of the file.
• adding a section, by creating also an entry inside the
section table. Each section entry is 40 bytes long, so all
content must be shifted of that amount, without messing
with both file and section alignments specified by the
header.
• adding import functions, by crafting an entry for the Im-
port Address Table, that specifies which function of which
library must be included during the loading process;
• filling slack space between sections, that is inserted by
the compiler to maintain the alignments inside the file.
These bytes are usually set to zero, and they are never
referenced by the code of the executable;
• packing, by encrypting or encoding the content of the
binary inside another binary and decoding it at run-
time. The effect of a packer is invasive, since the whole
structure of the input sample is modified.
Motivated by the write-up of the challenge, we decided to
consider the appending of an overlay. This mutation is trivial to
apply, as it does not require any specific tool, and it is effective
against both EMBER and MalConv. The content that will be
added at the end of the input malware samples will be taken
directly from sections belonging to legit executable. Intuitively
speaking, we believe that the addition of content taken from
goodware programs would trick the detector in computing the
probability of being a malware. In this context, each dimension
of the attack feature space is the content of a benign section:
the k parameter of Sk express the number of benign sections
that the attacker wants to use during the attack. The benign
content can be added in chunks of variable size, which is
helpful for relaxing the problem to the continuous domain.
Continuous relaxation: The problem can be formulated
as a continuous constraint minimization problem, by allowing
the use of real numbers inside the attack feature space. We
re-define the attack feature space as Sk ⊂ [0, 1]k, and each si
entry is a real number between 0 and 1. Since we are adding
bytes, we crop the content of the i-th section by taking only
a fraction expressed by si of the original content when we
add the section to the input malware. To clarify this concept,
if si = 0.4, the algorithm will take the 40% of the content
of i-th section. The problem is now continuous, and it can be
solved using all algorithms that do not compute derivatives
of the black-box function. In this context, the byte-constraint
function C(s) can be written as
C : Sk → R
C(s) = cTs (6)
where c is a vector containing the number of bytes of each
section. This product is needed since not all sections share
the same length, and they must be penalized accordingly.
The constraint is expressed as a dot product. Since both the
vector of sizes c and the attack feature vector s possess only
positive entries, the application of the dot product is equal
to considering the `1 norm, which impose sparsity over the
solution.
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C. Black-box optimization algorithm
To compute adversarial malware examples while ignoring
the implementation details of the target detector, we need
a black-box optimization algorithm. An objective function is
used to measure the distance from the optimal solution. The
technique we use for conducting our experiments is a genetic
algorithm, which generates new samples using the previous
one as parents. This strategy have been explored and proposed
also by other work in the state of the art [14], [19].Figure
shows the structure of the algorithm. The best solution is
Black-box optimization strategy: pseudo-code of the
genetic algorithm used for crafting payloads to inject into
the input malware inside GAMMA.
population size N , generations G, objective function g
Result: best candidate s∗
P ← N random points
F ← (Pi, g(Pi))Ni=1
i ← 0
S ← F
while i < G do
S ← selection(S)
S ← crossover(S)
S ← mutate(S)
S ← F ∪⋃s∈S (s, g(s))
i ← i+1
s∗ ← max(S)
return s∗
the one with minimal score. The objective function g for our
problem is formalized in Equation 4. The selection function
takes the best N elements from the set of candidates, those
with the smallest score computed by the objective function.
The crossover function swaps the values of a variable inside
two feature vectors, while the mutation function applies a
random mutation inside a feature vector. At each round, a set
of new candidates is produced and evaluated. Before moving
to the next round, the initial generation is added again to the
candidates, as it may be possible that some samples of the
initial population performs better w.r.t. the mutated ones. In
this way, the genetic process starts again, selecting the fittest
candidate for survival, eventually reaching a local minima for
the problem. The algorithm terminates after G iterations, and
the detector is queried exactly N(G+ 1) times. Our strategy
sets the constraint T over the whole amount of queries sent to
the detector, that is T = N(G+1), so the attacker must chose
G accordingly. In our context, each mutation is represented
by the addition of benign content inside the input malware.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We want to show empirical evidence of the intuitions
expressed in Section III, as we want to highlight the reg-
ularization effects on the crafted attack payload. We ran
our experiments against both EMBER and MalConv on a
workstation equipped with an Intel R© Xeon R© CPU E5-2670,
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Fig. 3: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve of both
classifiers.
with 48 CPU and 128 GB of RAM. The pre-trained version
of MalConv presents a slightly different architecture w.r.t. the
original formulation: 1 MB of input size and padding value of
256 to avoid the shifting pre-processing part. The network is
implemented using the Keras library [25]. For the black-box
optimizer included in GAMMA, we rely on the Pagmo2 [26]
library. We tested the the attack using a population size N
of 10 elements, varying the number of generations G. We
used the default optional parameters offered by Pagmo2 to
tune the algorithm, which comprise the choice of the selection,
mutation and cross-over functions.
A. Performance on test dataset in absence of attack
To evaluate the performance of both classifiers in the
absence of attack, we collected a set of 15, 000 benign and
15, 000 malware samples. The malware samples were gathered
from VirusTotal6, while the goodware samples were collected
by downloading executable programs from GitHub. The results
are shown in Figure 3. The threshold chosen for EMBER
is 0.8336, which corresponds to an Area Under the Curve
(AUC) of 0.98, while for MalConv the threshold is 0.5, that
corresponds to an AUC of 0.93. These results are comparable
to the description given by the authors of EMBER [6], as
both detectors achieve just a slightly lower score w.r.t. what is
reported in the paper. Still, they can be both used as a baseline
for our analysis.
B. Attack performance
Since the attack is formalized as a regularization problem,
we need to verify the effect of both constraints on the problem.
The size constraint is encoded into the minimization objective
by the regularizer, the request constraint is handled by con-
trolling the number of queries sent to the the detector. Since
the attack feature space Sk is parametric over the number of
sections the attacker may add, we extract the first 100 .data
sections from our goodware dataset, as discussed in Section
III-B, that will be used for adding content to the input malware.
Figure 4 shows the trade-off between size and confidence using
different values for the regularizer and number of queries. We
also reported the results of the application of random byte
sequences of increasing length, showing that both classifiers
are robust to such noise. The average accuracy is still near 99%
with no significant variance. Instead, when λ is set to large
values, the algorithm finds smaller solutions without caring
6https://www.virustotal.com
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Fig. 4: Attack performances by varying λ in the interval [10−7, 10−1], using 300 malware samples as input, compared with
the random attack. We sample 12 values, observing the achieved trade-off between size and confidence. The solid lines are
computed as a regression over the point of a particular setting of the experiments.
much about the attributed score, as the quantity to minimize is
dominated by the penalty term. As the value of λ decreases, the
algorithm finds more evasive samples with bigger payloads. By
increasing the number of queries, the attacker explores more
solutions in terms of both size and confidence.
Each point in Figure 4 corresponds to the mean confidence
and the mean payload size for a specific value of λ and number
of generations G used for crafting adversarial examples from
a set of 300 malicious programs. The λ parameter controls the
trade-off between size and accuracy. An increase of its value
corresponds to a more regularized solution, leading to smaller
but less effective payloads. When λ tends to zero the score
attributed by the classifier dominates the penalty associated
with the size. The black-box optimizer will thus find evasive
payloads without taking into account the size of the solution.
The effects mentioned above are enhanced by the number
of optimization steps performed by the black-box algorithm.
The space of the solutions is explored more by increasing
the number of generations of the genetic algorithm, allowing
it to craft adversarial examples that satisfies the constraints
posed by the fitness function, as shown in Figure 4. It is easy
to notice that the plots are shifted towards extreme solutions,
transitioning between large-and-evasive payloads to short-and-
ineffective ones. Since the threshold chosen for EMBER is
high, most of the evasion attacks are, in average, effective and
successful. It is still important to notice that the average accu-
racy does not decrease under a certain bound: many samples
are still classified as malicious, while other are not detected
anymore with high confidence of being goodware. This might
be caused by the discrete partitions of space produced by the
GBDT algorithm. The applied perturbations move a sample far
enough from its original partition, falling in an adjacent one
with zero confidence of being a malware. Such phenomenon
is depicted again in Figure 4 by the variance, highlighting
the instability of both detectors against adversarial noise.
However, since the function learnt by MalConv is continuous
and differentiable, the results are smoother w.r.t. EMBER.
C. Temporal analysis
From a temporal point of view, the complexity of
GAMMA is dominated by the time spent querying the
detector, that is encapsulated by the invocation of the objective
function. Figure 5 shows the speed of GAMMA, highlighting
the linearity of the approach, as the time spent optimizing
the attack increases linearly with the number of optimization
steps. Unsurprisingly, the time spent for computing adversarial
malware examples against EMBER is larger than the one
spent for MalConv, as the feature extraction step performed
by EMBER is more computationally and time demanding.
Nevertheless, the total time required to optimize our black-
box attack samples remains quite low, as we do not need to
iteratively execute any computationally-demanding validation
in a sandbox environment.
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Fig. 5: The plot represents the time spent for crafting adver-
sarial examples, with varying the number of generations. Each
solid line corresponds to the elapsed time of the black-box
attack for EMBER and MalConv.
D. Packing effect
Since these classifiers leverage only static features, it is
reasonable to ask ourselves whether encrypting the program
content is already sufficient to evade detection, without ap-
plying all the techniques we have introduced in Section III.
Packing is a technique that was introduced for reducing the
size of an executable, by applying a compression, encryption
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Fig. 6: Performances of both classifiers against the UPX packer. Each box-plot shows the distribution of the confidences
attributed by the classifiers under analysis, while the red horizontal line corresponds to the threshold used by the detector.
or encoding algorithm. Since the effect of a packer completely
changes the representation on disk of the program, it has been
extensively used by malware vendors to hide their product to
the analysts, increasing the difficulty of the reverse engineering
study of the sample. In this context, we apply one famous
technique, called UPX7 to 1000 malware and 1000 goodware
programs, and we test the evasion rate for both MalConv
and EMBER. We show in Figure 6a and 6b the effectiveness
of the UPX packer. It is clear that both detectors attribute
a malicious score when the sample is packed, and this is
intuitive by looking at the candle plot of the packed goodware
programs. Both detectors shift their score through the malware
class, while there is only a little change in terms of mean and
variance for the packed malware. We believe that a packing
technique can be useful for hiding against a statistic detector as
long as the algorithm has not been trained on samples packed
with that method. On the contrary, given enough samples
packed with a technique, the learning algorithm should be
able to capture the signature left by the packer itself inside
the packed program. For instance, the UPX packer creates
two executable sections called UPX0 and UPX1, that contain
the extraction code and the original compressed program. It
is likely that a learning algorithm would take advantage of
the presence of such signatures for discriminating between
benign and malicious programs. Evasion is more likely to be
achieved using unseen packers, i.e. custom solutions developed
by malware vendors themselves. Since writing a packer is
difficult, time consuming and prone to error, we believe that
adding content instead of perturbing the whole executable is
more stealthy and easy to implement.
E. Evaluation on Commercial Products
We are interested in understanding the effect of our method-
ology evaluated on commercial detectors, as we want to
test these small perturbations against these products. In this
context, we are not interested in packing the input samples, as
we believe that these methods should detect a threat even if
the difference between the two version is a small appended
payload. The mutations we apply to our malware samples
address only the syntactical structure of each program, and we
aim to evaluate here if the application of such transformation
can pose a threat to other antivirus programs. We expect that
7https://upx.github.io
most of the commercial solutions will not be affected by such
attacks. We rely on the response retrieved by VirusTotal,8
which is an online interface for many threat detectors. The
service offers an API that can be used for querying the system,
by uploading samples from remote. We test the performance
of our attack by sending 128 malware samples, before and
after attaching the adversarial payload to the sample, optimized
against the EMBER classifier. To validate the results of the
optimization attack, we performed a test using the same data
with a random payload of 14 KB attached. Since the attack
is optimized against machine-learning classifiers that extract
knowledge only from the structure of an input program, we
believe that commercial products (using also dynamic analy-
sis) should not be affected by neither our attack strategy or by
appending of small chunks of byte chosen at random. Both
plots in Figure 7 show the results of this experiment. Each
point in Figure 7a represents the number of detections achieved
by a particular antivirus, before and after the application of the
malicious payload. We obtained the following results:
• there are some antivirus programs that did not detect
anything, maybe due to internal VirusTotal timeout. They
are the one on the left bottom of the plot;
• there are products that detected more adversarial versions
of the input samples than their original representation.
This implies that, for some engines, the attachment of
such payload is and indicator for malicious behavior.
They are the ones lying above the diagonal;
• there are engines that are fooled multiple times by the
attack we performed against EMBER. They are recog-
nizable as they lie below the diagonal.
By looking at Figure 7b, we can appreciate that most of the
adversarial attacks are more effective than the random attacks.
Since each point is computed as a ratio between the number of
detections after the attack divided by the number of detections
before the attack, the classifiers that fall below the dashed line
are fooled more often by the adversarial attack rather than the
random one. To sum up, these detectors manifest a weakness
against small perturbations as well as the statistical algorithms
we used for our analysis, even if the attack is not crafted
against them.
8https://virustotal.com
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Fig. 7: Transferring the attack against the antivirus engines offered by VirusTotal. On the left, each point represents the number
of malware samples flagged as malicious by a particular antivirus program, before and after having computed the attack on
the EMBER classifier. On the right, each point stands for the detection ratio after both attacks.
V. RELATED WORK
There are other approaches that differ from GAMMA,
as they consider different settings and solutions. There are
other work that explore the creation of adversarial examples
for information-security detectors, leveraging both gradient-
based and black-box algorithms. Moreover, many algorithm
are inspired by attacks proposed against classifiers that do not
belong to any security-related domain.
A. Competing approaches to GAMMA
Compared to the work proposed by Castro et al. [13], [14],
we do not need to validate the malware inside a sandbox, as
we include domain knowledge inside the mutation process.
Moreover, we did not impose a threshold as a stopping con-
dition for our strategy, as we aim to show how much we can
degrade the performance of a target classifier with this black-
box algorithm. If we switch to the attacker’s side, we would
chose to stop the algorithm when the adversarial malware has
reached evasion successfully, saving both computational power
and time. Moreover, the authors of these work state that they
need approximately almost 4 minutes for creating adversarial
malware, using 100 queries. No architecture details have been
unveiled. Our methods performs 1,000 queries in the same
time, showing how much the functionality-preserving transfor-
mations are helpful w.r.t. the performance of the attack. They
also do not report which are the most influential mutations
that lead to evasion: the latter is crucial, we are dealing with
potential vulnerabilities that lies inside statistical algorithms,
whose presence is less evident compared to other security
breaches.
Anderson et al. [15] propose a reinforcement learning ap-
proach to decide the best sequence of manipulation that leads
to evasion. To test the effectiveness of the agent, they also test
the application of manipulations picked at random. Results
show that the learned policy perform slightly better than the
random one. Authors do not report the resulting file size of
the adversarial malware: the reinforcement learning method
contains actions that enlarge the representation on disk, but it
is not clear how and how much. The model they used as a
baseline is a primordial version of the EMBER classifier we
have analyzed in this work, trained on fewer samples.
Hu et al. [17] develop a Generative Adversarial Network
(GAN) [27] whose aim is to craft adversarial malware that
bypass a target classifier. The network learns which API im-
ports should be added to the original sample, that is interesting
since the algorithm ignores the semantics of all the objects that
are considered, and still it is able to create points that evade the
target classifier. However, no real malware is crafted, as that is
attack only operates inside the feature space. The result of the
GAN serves only as a trace for the attacker, to understand what
should be changed inside its malware. In contrast, we create
functioning malware, as real samples are generated each time.
A recap of the black-box attacks against Windows malware
detectors can be found in Table I, where we compare the tech-
niques we mentioned above with our method. ARMED [13]
explores the space of the attack using random mutations, all the
other techniques focuses on guided optimization. Moreover,
ARMED [13] and AIMED [14] requires validation through a
sandbox, while all the other techniques do not. MalGAN [17]
does not create any functioning malware, since the attack is
crafted inside the feature space and the manipulations are not
propagated back on the real malware samples. The reinforce-
ment learning (RL) algorithm proposed by Anderson et al. [15]
does not highlight successful results, as the optimizer is not
able to really explore the space of solutions. Both ARMED and
AIMED use the transformations introduced by Anderson et al.
and it is not clear if the RL algorithm breaks the functionality
of the malware it mutates. These techniques presents different
results, more investigation is required to determine the stability
of the presented results.
B. Gradient attacks against malware detectors
Kolosnjaji et al. [11] apply a gradient-based attack against
MalConv, by appending bytes to the overlay. Since MalConv
is not fully differentiable, the attack takes place inside the
embedding space. The gradient allows the attacker to append
bytes that most reduce the confidence of the input malware.
Experimental results show that the number of padding bytes
needed to evade ranges from 2 KB to 10 KB. Demetrio et
al. [10] fine-tune the attack proposed by Kolosnjaji et al.
by generalizing the algorithm w.r.t. the location to apply the
perturbations, and showing that the same network can be
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No sandbox Functioning malware Feasible manipulations Attack optimization Payload size optimization
GAMMA 3 3 3 3 3
ARMED [13] 3
AIMED [14] 3 3
Anderson et al. [15] 3 3 3 3
MalGAN [17] 3 3
TABLE I: State of the art of black-box adversarial attacks against Windows malware detectors.
bypassed by manipulating only 58 bytes inside the DOS header
of an executable. Similarly, Kreuk et al. [12] applied the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [23] to alter not only
padding, but also slack bytes, that are bytes inserted between
section to maintain alignment. However, they show that the
slack locations are not enough for crafting an adversarial
exe malware, and they need to include padding as well. The
attack is formulated again in the embedding space, but the
real bytes are only computed after the algorithm has found
an evading sample. Rosenberg et al. [16] attack a Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) using a black-box strategy [22] by
reconstructing the target classifier under attack. They fool
the proposed RNN by injecting fake API calls at run-time,
wrapping the input malware inside another program with the
correct sequence of API that needs to be called for producing
the sample. While the wrapper they developed is interesting
for proposing a different way for mutating a malware, neither
code and results have been publicly released by the authors.
Suciu et al. [28] explored a similar approach to Kreuk et al.,
by applying the FGSM, and compute adversarial payloads to
be inserted between sections (if there is available space) and as
padding. No code has been released yet for testing the attack.
C. Black-box attacks against other security-related detectors
Xu et al. [19] propose a fully black-box attack scheme that
relies on a genetic algorithm to produce adversarial examples.
They show that this approach is suitable for security applica-
tion, as they successfully create functioning adversarial PDF
malware that evade state-of-the-art PDF malware detectors.
On the other hand, since this method ignores the internal
technical details of the PDF format, the black-box optimization
produces both functioning and also broken PDF malware
that are lately discarded by the evolution. As shown by the
authors, this is very time consuming, as the algorithm needs
to learn which manipulations break the original semantics and
which not. Laskov et al. [29] show a black-box attack against
PDFRate [30], which is a PDF malware detector. The authors
simulate an adversary that have only partial information re-
garding the classifier under attack. They reconstruct the victim
model and they perform gradient attacks against it, transferring
them to the real one. The attack injects content inside the PDF
malware, successfully fooling both the surrogate and the target.
D. Generic Black-box attacks in other domains
Papernot et al. [22] show that it is possible to evade an
unknown classifier by reconstructing a local surrogate model.
The attacker need to query the target classifier to construct
a surrogate dataset that will be used for training the model.
The adversary computes the attack against the trained local
classifier and it tries to transfer the samples to the target as
well. This is time consuming as the attacker needs to send
many queries to the target system, as all samples inside the
surrogate dataset need to be labeled. Ilyas et al. [31] apply the
Natural Evolution Strategy (NES) [32] to reduce the number
of queries that are needed to compute the black-box attack,
by imposing a distribution over the manipulation and use the
ones that allow the algorithm to explore more. Chen et al. [33]
propose the so-called Zeroth Order Optimization (ZOO), that
estimate the gradient of the victim classifier by sampling points
around the input. This strategy reduce the number of queries,
as the search is local and only around a particular point.
E. Malware detection through machine learning
Detecting malware is a difficult task, and the state-of-the-art
thrives of possible solutions to this problem. Saxe et al. [1]
develop a deep neural network which is trained on top of a
feature extraction phase. The authors consider imports, bytes
and strings distributions along with metadata taken from the
headers, for a total of 1024 input variables. The method
seems promising, as the results show a ROC of 99% on
their dataset. However, even if they claim to have released
all code and data, no source is available online for further
testing or investigation. Kolosnjaji et al. [2] propose to track
which API are called by a malware, capturing the execution
trace using the Cuckoo sandbox,9 that is a dynamic analysis
virtual environment for testing malware. Again, neither source
code or pre-trained models have been publicly released. Hardy
et al. [3] statically extract which API are called by a program,
and they train a deep network over this representation. No
source code is available for testing. David et al. [4] develop
a network that learns new signatures from input malware, by
posing the issue as a reconstruction problem. The network
infers a new representation of the data, in a end-to-end fashion.
These new signatures can be used as input for other machine
learning algorithms. The source code for re-constructing the
method is available on GitHub, but no pre-trained models
are available for evaluation. Incer et al. [5] try to tackle the
issue of adversarially robust classifier, by imposing monotonic
constraints over the features used for the classification tasks.
Results are interesting, but again neither code or pre-trained
models are publicly available.
VI. LIMITATIONS AND OPEN ISSUES
We have shown that an attacker can optimize the injection
of benign content into malware programs, achieving evasion
against learning-based malware detectors. This approach is
9https://cuckoosandbox.org/
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clearly not effective against systems that use features com-
puted by dynamically executing the input program. However,
even if malware detectors based on different feature represen-
tations are not affected by our attack, the attacker may be able,
at least in principle, to identify feasible transformations that
can alter their input representation. In this case, our attack can
be used to optimize such transformations and evade dynamic
malware detectors with minimal modifications.
Another limitation of our approach is posed by the nature
of the feasible manipulations chosen by the attacker. Since the
attack feature space is mathematically formalized as a space
of predefined static manipulations, it can not include random
dynamic-generated content, such as random byte sequences.
To mimic the generation of random content, the attacker
should create a set of random sequences that will not change
during the optimization of the attack.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We propose a black-box evasion strategy that considers only
feasible manipulations, i.e. transformations applied to the input
malware that do not alter its original semantics. We show
that it is possible to omit the validation step and speed up
the computation of such adversarial examples. We develop
a mathematical framework for describing the capabilities of
an adversary, the attack feature space. It provides the at-
tacker with a multi-dimensional space, in which each axis
corresponds to a particular transformation that the attacker
can apply to the input malware. To impose the application
of small perturbations, we add a regularization term in our
objective that penalizes the injection of larger payloads. This
term is calibrated by a regularization parameter that controls
the norm of the attack vector. Since this is a black-box attack,
the adversary wants to send as few query as possible. To
express this constraint, we limit the number of requests sent
to the detector by stopping the algorithm after having reached
the desired amount of queries.
We successfully land evasion attacks against two well-
known baseline detectors using GAMMA, i.e. an implemen-
tation of the formalization we have introduced in this work.
Results are more accurate as the number of queries sent to the
detector increases, since our algorithm is allowed to explore
a larger portion of the solution space and thus finds better
local optima. The main vulnerability of the two detectors under
analysis is posed by the presence of byte-based features, which
can be easily manipulated by the attacker. We thus discourage
using only such features for the purpose of malware detection.
We also show that this attack transfers on some commercial
detectors hosted by VirusTotal, by reducing the number of
detected threats w.r.t. the original detection rate. The transfer
attack is also more effective than the injection of randomly
generated payloads: we hypothesize a direct attack against
these detectors might be even more effective, since our strategy
will optimize the payloads for these particular systems.
However, this attack only works against static detectors. We
would like to explore the world of dynamic analysis, studying
how an attacker can manipulate the flow of execution to his
advantage, fooling these kind of classifiers in the process.
The latter requires a more in-depth study of the loading and
execution process of a program: altering the control flow of an
executable implies adding code, API imports and function calls
without mining the original malicious behaviour. Since many
malware samples are packed and highly obfuscated, is not yet
clear how and which transformations might be applied safely.
To this context, the attacker needs new feasible manipulations
suitable to the dynamic analysis scenario.
The combination of both static and dynamic evasion would
pose an interesting yet problematic line of research for these
new learning detectors, by effectively exposing their weak-
nesses, and proposing new hardening schemes that can be
applied to increase robustness against adversarial malware.
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